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Disgorgement Plans Under the Fair Funds Provision of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Are Creditors and
Investors Truly Being Protected?
Don Carrillo*
I. INTRODUCTION
"By the way, you know the six billion dollars in assets that we re-
ported, we were just kidding; they were actually expenses." Imagine
the devastating impact these words had on a heavily invested share-
holder or any entity with significant equity in the disclosing corpora-
tion. In the wake of one of the largest public accounting frauds in
history, investors and creditors of WorldCom, Inc. ("WorldCom")
were forced to face the harsh reality that they had relied on over nine
billion dollars of false or unsupported accounting entries in their in-
vestment or loan decisions.1 Recognizing that the defrauded victims of
corporate scandals such as WorldCom and Enron Corp. ("Enron")
were left, in many instances, with irreparable harm under the current
corporate governance legislation, Congress passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley" or "Act"). 2 The Act was in-
tended to protect investors and other parties who reasonably rely on
corporate disclosures by improving the accuracy and reliability of
those disclosures through the imposition of new and heightened crimi-
* Juris Doctor from DePaul University College of Law expected 2008; Bachelor of Arts from
Indiana University, 2005. I would like to thank Professor William Blais, Mark Schraufnagel,
Michael A. Shammas, and Kwabena Larbi-Siaw for their guidance and substantive feedback on
this Comment. Thanks are also due to Sean P. Driscoll of Clifford Law Offices P.C. and my
fellow editors on the DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal.
1. DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC. (2003), available at http://fll.
findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/bdspcomm6O903rpt.pdf [hereinafter
WORLDCOM INVESTIGATIVE REPORT]. The Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Di-
rectors of WorldCom, Inc. submitted a report of its investigation. Id. The Committee reported an
excess of nine billion in false or unsupported accounting entries were made in WorldCom's fi-
nancial systems in order to achieve desired reported financial results. Id. at 1.
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
316 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
nal penalties and other means of depriving corporate actors of their
ill-gotten gains.3
Following the corporate scandals of WorldCom, Enron, Adelphia,
and other high-profile instances of fraud, investors and creditors alike
demanded safeguards to restore their confidence in the investment
market. The primary vehicle by which Congress intended to reunite
victims of corporate fraud with their assets was the "Fair Funds for
Investors" provision of Sarbanes-Oxley. 4 Under this provision, Con-
gress provided for the addition of civil penalties, at the discretion of
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission"), to create
disgorgement plans for the "benefit of the victims" of corporate
fraud.5 Sarbanes-Oxley provided that "in any action or proceeding
brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the
securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any federal court may
grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for
the benefit of investors."'6 Prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley,
the typical form of relief obtained by the Commission was disgorge-
ment of ill-gotten gains from the culpable parties. Sarbanes-Oxley ex-
panded on this remedy by including the Fair Funds for Investors
("Fair Funds") provision, which authorized the Commission to add to
the disgorgement fund any civil penalties obtained in the same pro-
ceeding "for the benefit of the victims" of the securities violation. 7
This was great news for all defrauded parties, right? Wrong.
In its haste to pass Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress neglected to establish
a standard of review a district court must apply to its consideration of
disgorgement plans proposed by the Commission pursuant to its au-
thority under the Act. Given the nature of corporate fraud, a diverse
range of investors and creditors comprised the defrauded "victims"
Sarbanes-Oxley was intended to protect. Naturally, the nature and ex-
tent of the disgorgement plan proposed by the Commission would di-
rectly affect the ability of each party to realize the losses caused by a
corporation's fraudulent activity. Because Congress failed to provide
any guidance with regard to the appropriate standard of review to be
given to disgorgement plans ordered by the SEC, the courts were left
3. See Press Release, The White House Office of Communications, Statement by the Presi-
dent (July 30, 2002) (President Bush's statement upon signing H.R. 3763), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730-10.html.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2006).
5. Id.
6. § 78(u).
7. § 7246 (providing that the amount of such civil penalty shall, on the motion or at the direc-
tion of the Commission, be added to and become part of the disgorgement fund for the benefit
of the victims of such violation).
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to speculate and fashion impromptu standards of review to such plans.
The lack of congressional guidance and experience in reviewing dis-
gorgement plans after the enactment of the Fair Funds provision of
Sarbanes-Oxley laid the foundation for inequitable results precedent
to follow.
In October of 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
ruled on a case of first impression, which centered on the appropriate
standard of review given to proposed disgorgement plans by the Com-
mission.8 According to the Second Circuit, a disgorgement plan pro-
posed by the Commission can arbitrarily exclude vast numbers of
investors or creditors as long as the district court deems the plan to be
"fair and reasonable." 9 Citing case law pre-dating the enactment of
Sarbanes-Oxley, the Second Circuit held once the district court satis-
fies itself that the distribution of proceeds in a proposed Commission
disgorgement plan is fair and reasonable, its review is at an end. 10 The
court reasoned that the primary purpose of disgorgement orders was
to deter violations of securities laws by depriving violators of their ill-
gotten gains.1 Therefore, given the fact that disgorgement plans are
deterrent in nature, a disgorgement plan's function is achieved the in-
stant the ill-gotten funds leave the hands of a corporate wrongdoer. 12
While this proposition certainly has appeal at first glance, it disre-
gards any claim investors and creditors have to those funds as a result
of their reliance on the corporation's fraudulent activity. Parties in-
jured by corporate fraud certainly have the right to be placed in their
"rightful position" in the event an award is obtained from a corpora-
tion that had previously engaged in fraudulent activity.13 Accordingly,
courts must recognize that the new Fair Funds legislation shifted the
focus of disgorgement plans in the corporate context from that of de-
terrence to compensating victims of corporate fraud. The crux of this
issue lies in an analysis of the purpose of disgorgement penalties in the
8. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.
2006).
9. Id. at 82-84.
10. "The district court possesses the equitable power to grant disgorgement without inquiring
whether, or to what extent, identifiable private parties have been damaged by [defendant's]
fraud." SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir.
1985)).
11. WorldCom, 467 F.3d at 81.
12. See id.
13. Kelly-Rose Garrity, Whose Award Is It Anyway?: Implications of Awarding the Entire Sum
of Punitive Damages to the State, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 395, 397 (2006) (noting the purpose of
compensatory damages is "to return the injured party to his 'rightful' position-the position he
would have occupied but for the defendant's wrongdoing"). The purpose of compensatory dam-
ages is to make the injured party whole.
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corporate context; whether that purpose is inherently deterrent or
compensatory in nature. If a court adheres to the position that dis-
gorgement penalties are primarily deterrent in nature, as in the case of
the Second Circuit, the standard of review to be given a proposed dis-
gorgement plan for disbursement amongst the victims of fraud is
merely an afterthought and a lax standard of review is appropriate.
However, if a court properly concludes disgorgement plans, in the
context of corporate conduct, serve as a means to compensate victims
of corporate fraud so that they may be placed in their collective
"rightful" positions, a more stringent independent standard of review
is required to ensure that those victims are compensated in fact.
In suggesting that reviewing courts should apply a heightened inde-
pendent review to disgorgement plans proposed by the Commission,
this Comment will analyze the abrupt shift in the policy objective dis-
gorgement plans were intended to achieve with the enactment of
Sarbanes-Oxley. Part II of this Comment will examine the role of dis-
gorgement plans in the context of corporate activity. In considering
the "Rational Actor" principle of deterrence, Part II will demonstrate
disgorgement penalties are an ineffective means of deterring execu-
tive misconduct, as corporate executives face independent market
pressures that break down the Rational Actor Model. Part III of this
Comment will explore the Fair Funds for Investors provision of
Sarbanes-Oxley and its application to the recent WorldCom scandal.
Part III will conduct a brief case study of WorldCom's fraudulent ac-
tivity and will investigate the Second Circuit's treatment of disgorge-
ment penalties against WorldCom. Part IV proposes this Comment's
thesis: disgorgement penalties under the Fair Funds for Investors pro-
vision of Sarbanes-Oxley were intended to act as a means for the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission to reunite victims of corporate
fraud with their wrongfully deprived assets. In suggesting that dis-
gorgement penalties are compensatory, rather than deterrent, in na-
ture, this Comment will further assert that a heightened and
independent standard of review must be given to disgorgement plans
proposed by the Commission to ensure that identifiable victims of cor-
porate fraud are in fact placed in their collective "rightful" positions.
II. THE FAIR FUNDS FOR INVESTORS PROVISION OF SARBANES-
OXLEY AND ACCOMPANYING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Throughout the voluminous legislative history accompanying
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Fair Funds for Investors provision in particu-
lar, two general themes are introduced: (1) restoration of investor
confidence in the nation's financial markets and protection of their
[Vol. 6:315
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investments, and (2) more stringent corporate governance to deter fu-
ture misconduct. This Part introduces the Fair Funds for Investors
provision of Sarbanes-Oxley and proposes its primary function of dis-
gorgement of ill-received funds from corporate fraud serves not to de-
ter future misconduct, as discussed above, but is a vehicle through
which a court may rightfully compensate victims of such misconduct.
The Fair Funds provision provides in relevant part:
(a) Civil penalties added to disgorgement funds for the relief of
victims
If in any judicial or administrative action brought by the Commis-
sion under the securities laws.., the Commission obtains an order
requiring disgorgement against any person for a violation of such
laws or the rules or regulations thereunder, or such person agrees in
settlement of any such action to such disgorgement, and the Com-
mission also obtains pursuant to such laws a civil penalty against
such person, the amount of such civil penalty shall, on the motion or
at the direction of the Commission, be added to and become part of
the disgorgement fund for the benefit of the victims of such
violation.14
It is a well-grounded principle of statutory construction that "where
the language of a statute is plain, unambiguous, and well understood
according to its natural and ordinary sense and meaning, the statute
itself furnishes a rule of construction beyond which the court cannot
go." 15 Examination of the Fair Funds provision reveals the following
two key aspects: First, the Commission has discretion as to whether
civil penalties are to be added to disgorgement funds. Second, in the
event a civil penalty is obtained and added to a disgorgement fund,
the entire fund is to be "for the benefit of the victims of [the corporate
fraud]."'1 6 On July 28, 2006, Congress included the phrase "for the
benefit of the victims" to reflect a primary concern that previous legis-
lation had thrown obstacles in the way of securities fraud victims.17
Inclusion of the phrase demonstrated the fact that Congress made an
effort to ensure such obstacles were removed.' 8 The United States Su-
preme Court ("Court") has instructed that a basic assumption of stat-
utory interpretation is that the ordinary meaning of the statutory
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose. 19 Applying the
14. 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2006) (emphasis added).
15. Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S. 474, 477 (1960).
16. § 7246.
17. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 8 (2002).
18. Id. (indicating current regulations did not do an adequate job of ensuring accountability in
our legal system to prevent corporate scandals or to offer constructive remedies and decisive
punishment should they occur).
19. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 546 (1992).
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Court's guidance to interpretation of the Fair Funds provision, the
phrase, "for the benefit of the victims," must be read to evidence Con-
gress's intention that disgorgement plans compensate those harmed
by corporate misconduct. Any other interpretation would subvert the
plain meaning of the statute, making its mandatory language merely
permissive. 20
Even if one follows the rationale that ascertainment of the meaning
apparent on the face of a statute need not end the inquiry, both the
context in which Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted and its accompanying
legislative history bolster the argument that the Fair Funds provision
functions as a means by which victims of corporate misconduct are to
be compensated. The context of corporate scandal and near decima-
tion of investor confidence constitutes persuasive evidence that the
Fair Funds provision is compensatory in nature. 21 The Enron situation
opened Congress's eyes to the shortcomings of reuniting victims of
corporate scandals with the funds wrongfully taken from them, and, as
this Comment will show, enactment of the Fair Funds provision was a
major step in the direction of providing such compensation. Essen-
tially, Sarbanes-Oxley authorizes the Commission to bring administra-
tive and civil actions against corporations suspected of engaging in
activities volatile of its enumerated securities laws.
In the event the Commission obtains an order authorizing a fine
against the corporation, any civil penalties, arising out of the same
action, may be added to the fine at the discretion of the Commis-
sion.22 This common fund comprises the "disgorgement fund," which
may either be paid to the United States Treasury or to the victims of
the fraudulent activity. Conflict arises when the district court deter-
mines the disgorgement fund be returned to the "victims" of the cor-
porate misconduct. In many instances, multiple parties (creditors,
investors, consumers, etc.) may have a valid claim to a corporation's
assets and are entitled to a percentage of the disgorgement fund.
Sarbanes-Oxley authorizes the Commission to create a distribution
plan and ultimately determine which parties will be entitled to their
rightful portion of the disgorgement fund.23 Consider the following
20. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 338 (2000) (indicating inclusion of the term "shall" ex-
presses a congressional mandate that the following be given its plain meaning and carried out
accordingly). Following this reasoning, in the event the Commission exercises its discretion to
add a civil penalty to a disgorgement plan, it "shall" be for the benefit of the victims of the
corporate misconduct.
21. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2006).
23. § 7246.
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factual account to understand the breadth of the responsibility and
consequences following a reviewing court's decision.
In the aftermath of the WorldCom scandal, the Commission pro-
posed a distribution plan that provided for the disgorgement fund to
be distributed to eligible claimants who purchased WorldCom securi-
ties from April 29, 1999 through the close of the markets on June 25,
2002 and retained such securities until the close of the markets on
June 25, 2002.24 As a result, the definition of an "eligible securi-
tyholder" excluded any securityholder who learned of the fraud on
June 25, 2002 and sold his security on such date as a result of the fraud
announcement prior to the closing of the markets.25 One need only
reflect on the situation of investors who learned of the fraud and sold
their securities prior to the close of the markets on June 25, 2002 for a
moment to understand the injustice they would face if a reviewing
court were to approve of the above disgorgement fund. Yet, this is
precisely what happened. 26
Two schools of thought have emerged as to the standard of review
to be given to disgorgement plans authorized under the Fair Funds
provision of Sarbanes-Oxley. First, the Second Circuit adheres to its
traditional position that disgorgement penalties are deterrent in na-
ture; and, as a result, a review of a proposed disgorgement plan need
only ensure it is "fair and reasonable" under the circumstances. 27 This
position can hardly be reconciled with either the plain language of the
Fair Funds provision or the accompanying legislative history. On the
other hand, proponents of a heightened standard of review indicate
that the phrase "for the benefit of the victims" included within the
Fair Funds provision marked a sea of change from the traditional be-
lief that disgorgement funds acted as deterrents to the position that
such funds were vehicles by which courts could ensure that victims of
fraud were compensated. 28
A. Passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
In his statement upon signing Sarbanes-Oxley into law, President
George W. Bush stated the "Act adopts tough new provisions to deter
and punish corporate and accounting fraud and corruption, ensure
justice for wrongdoers, and protect the interests of workers and share-
24. SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, 2004 WL 1621185 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004).
25. Id.
26. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.
2006).
27. Id. at 82-84.
28. Id. at 82-83.
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holders. ' 29 Amidst the array of corporate scandals discussed above,
Michael G. Oxley, the Chairman of the House Financial Services
Committee, sponsored the Corporate and Auditing Accountability,
Responsibility and Transparency Act, which passed in the House in
April.30 Also in mid-June, Senator Paul Sarbanes, Chairman of the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, introduced his
own bill, The Public Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act
of 2002.31 On July 10, 2002, an amendment proposed by Senator Das-
chle on behalf of Senator Joseph Biden, was offered to increase crimi-
nal penalties related to conspiracy, mail and wire fraud, as well as
some ERISA violations.32 This amendment passed ninety-six to zero
later that day and the "Sarbanes-Oxley" Act, which emerged from
conference on July 25, was presented to the President on July 26 and
signed into law on July 29, 2002. 33
B. The Second Circuit's Inappropriate Adoption of the "Fair and
Reasonable" Standard of Review of Disgorgement
Plans Proposed by the Securities &
Exchange Commission
The only circuit to hear the issue of whether a heightened standard
of review should be given to proposed disgorgement plans was the
Second Circuit in 2006.34 On July 7, 2003, the district court of New
York approved a final settlement between WorldCom and the Com-
mission, under which the company would pay a civil penalty of seven
hundred fifty million dollars. 35 The settlement included a nominal dis-
gorgement of one dollar, which triggered the Fair Fund provision, al-
lowing the civil penalty to be added to the disgorgement fund and
distributed to defrauded investors. 36 Because there was not enough
money to compensate all the victims of WorldCom's fraud, the Plan
excluded several groups of investors.37 In particular, the Plan excluded
investors who recovered thirty-six cents or more on the dollar under
29. Press Release, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
30. Jennifer S. Recine, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1546 (2002) ("The bill focused largely on trans-
parency in, and oversight of, corporate accounting practices; [but] contained no provision for
white-collar penalty enhancements.").
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1547.
33. Id.
34. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.
2006).
35. Id. at 76.
36. Id.
37. Id.
[Vol. 6:315
2008] ARE CREDITORS AND INVESTORS TRULY BEING PROTECTED? 323
the Chapter 11 reorganization plan or through the sale of their "eligi-
ble securities" and investors who made a net profit on their combined
purchases or sales of "eligible securities" during the period in which
the fraud occurred. 38
An example of the inequities inherent in the proposed disgorge-
ment plan can be found in the fact that the district court approved a
definition of "eligible security" to include "any security registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, whether debt or eq-
uity, issued by WorldCom, Inc., or any of its affiliated debtors.' '39 The
fact that an "eligible security" included shares issued by not only
WorldCom, but also any of its affiliated debtors, meant a security
holder who suffered a loss in his or her WorldCom position as a result
of the corporate fraud may have nevertheless been excluded from the
disgorgement fund if his or her equity position in an affiliated debtor
appreciated to an amount where a total net profit was realized. 40 As
38. Id. at 76. See also SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, 2004 WL 1621185 (S.D.N.Y.
July 20, 2004).
39. See Further Order Approving Distribution Plan, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963
(S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004) (emphasis added), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
worldcom163a.pdf.
40. A list of "eligible securities" includes:
o oCommon Stock
WorldCom Group Common Stock
MCI Group Common Stock
Preferred Stock
WorldCom Series D Preferred Stock
WorldCom Series E Preferred Stock
WorldCom Series F Preferred Stock
MCI Capital I 8.00% Cumulative Quarterly Income Preferred Securities, Series A
Intermedia 13.5% Redeemable Exchangeable Preferred Stock due 2009
Debt Securities
WorldCom 6.25% Senior Notes due 2003
WorldCom 7.875% Senior Notes due 2003
WorldCom 7.55% Senior Notes due 2004
WorldCom 6.5% Senior Notes due 2004
WorldCom 6.40% Senior Notes due 2005
WorldCom 8.00% Senior Notes due 2006
WorldCom 7.75% Senior Notes due 2007
WorldCom 6.75% EUR Senior Notes due 2008
WorldCom 7.25% GBP Senior Notes due 2008
WorldCom 8.25% Senior Notes due 2010
WorldCom 7.50% Senior Notes due 2011
WorldCom 7.75% Senior Notes due 2027
WorldCom 6.95% Senior Notes due 2028
WorldCom 8.25% Senior Notes due 2031
MCI 7.5% Senior Notes due 2004
MCI 6.95% Senior Notes due 2006
MCI 6.5% Senior Notes due 2010
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such, the shareholder's loss in WorldCom's stock in reliance on the
fraudulent accounting figures became obviated by an unrelated, yet
prudent, investment decision grounded in sound accounting disclo-
sures. The prudent investment, in essence, acted as a hindrance to the
investor in his or her realization of the losses incurred as a result of
WorldCom's fraud.
The district court remarked the settlement was "not only fair and
reasonable, but as good an outcome as anyone could reasonably ex-
pect in these difficult circumstances. ' 41 On appeal, the Second Circuit
upheld the district court's approval of the proposed disgorgement
plan.42 Citing pre-Sarbanes-Oxley case law, the court reasoned:
Although disgorged profits may be distributed to defrauded inves-
tors, "[t]he primary purpose of disgorgement orders is to deter vio-
lations of the securities laws by depriving violators of their ill-gotten
gains." Given that compensation of fraud victims is a "secondary
goal," the size of a disgorgement order "need not be tied to the
losses suffered by defrauded investors. 43
Reliance on precedent pre-dating Sarbanes-Oxley seems misplaced
given the sheer magnitude of the corporate scandals and their devas-
tating effect on creditors, investors, employees, and all other inter-
ested parties, leading to Sarbanes-Oxley's enactment in the first place.
Sarbanes-Oxley's legislative history, including the bankruptcies of En-
ron Corp. and Global Crossing LLC and the restatements of earnings
by several prominent market participants, regulators, investors, and
MCI 8.25% Senior Debentures due 2023
MCI 7.75% Senior Debentures due 2024
MCI Senior Debentures due 2025
MCI Senior Debentures due 2027
Intermedia 11.25% Series B Senior Discount Notes due 2007
Intermedia 8.875% Series B Senior Notes due 2007
Intermedia 8.50% Series B Senior Notes due 2008
Intermedia 8.60% Series B Senior Notes due 2008
Intermedia 9.50% Series B Senior Notes due 2009
Intermedia 12.25% Series B Senior Subordinated Discount Notes due 2009
Id. at 28-29.
41. SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). See also SEC v.
WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, 2004 WL 1621185, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("When funds are
limited, hard choices must be made. Although a plan that included each of these excluded
groups might also pass muster, the decision to exclude them was a fair and reasonable exercise of
the Commission's discretion.").
42. WorldCom, 467 F.3d at 76.
43. Id. at 81 (quoting SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997)). Again, it must
be noted that the case law cited by the court pre-dates the passage and enactment of the Fair
Funds provision of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Thus, it can hardly be argued that this language
was written with any degree of consideration for the "benefit of investors and creditors" as is the
focus of the plain language of the Fair Funds provision.
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others, expressly demonstrates the need for new and comprehensive
securities legislation. 44 While all parties must concede deterrence
surely remains a major component of Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress in-
tended to alter the main function of disgorgement orders to vehicles
through which funds may be returned to victims of fraud.
The Senate professed Sarbanes-Oxley would play a crucial role in
restoring trust in the financial markets by ensuring corporate fraud
and greed may be better detected, prevented, and prosecuted.45 While
this exemplifies the first of the dual purposes of Sarbanes-Oxley (de-
terrence of future fraud), the Senate also indicated that the Act would
ensure victims of securities fraud had a fair chance to pursue their
claims and recoup their losses.46 Consistent with the reference to "vic-
tims," which is found in the Fair Funds provision of Sarbanes-Oxley,
the congressional report emphasized its focus on the victims of corpo-
rate fraud and concern for their compensation. 47 This reveals congres-
sional intent to embrace the position that provisions within Sarbanes-
Oxley ensure that investors, creditors, and other injured parties are
not only protected from corruption, but are also compensated for
their losses.
C. Disgorgement Plans Function Primarily as a Means of
Compensating Victims of Corporate Fraud Rather Than as
a Deterrent to Corporate Actors from
Engaging in Fraud
George W. Bush stated:
Today I have signed into law H.R. 3763 [Sarbanes-Oxley], "An Act
to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of cor-
porate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws and for
other purposes." The Act adopts tough new provisions to deter and
punish corporate and accounting fraud and corruption.., and pro-
tect the interests of workers and shareholders. 48
44. H.R. REP. No. 107-414 at 18-19 (2002) (stating old securities laws, such as the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, reflect the technology available to public companies and investors at that
time, and the securities laws largely reflect the paper-based system of reporting information that
was prevalent up until the advent of the electronic age). This development heightened the need
for more rapid disclosure of company news and ultimately increased regulation.
45. S. REP. No. 107-146 at 2 (2002) (noting the bill contains a number of provisions intended
to increase the criminal penalties for serious fraud, ensure that evidence, both physical and testi-
monial, is preserved and available in fraud cases, and provide prosecutors with the tools they
need to prosecute those who commit securities fraud).
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id.
48. Press Release, supra note 3.
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This statement by President George W. Bush identifies two key con-
cepts: First, Sarbanes-Oxley was intended to accomplish the policy ob-
jective of deterring corruption in the corporate arena. Second, the
Act's provisions should be read in the context of protecting the inter-
ests of workers, shareholders, and presumably any other party af-
fected by corporate scandals. Thus, it had become apparent that
Sarbanes-Oxley was to act as both a deterrent to future corporate mis-
conduct, as well as a means of safeguarding the interests, financial or
otherwise, of individuals who interact with these corporations.
The assertion that disgorgement orders function solely as a means
to deter corporate misconduct demonstrates a basic misunderstanding
of the competing market pressures corporate executives face in their
daily activities. As this Comment will show, the deterrent effect of the
disgorgement of wrongfully obtained profits is subsumed within the
independent market pressures high-ranking executives face in the
context of multi-billion dollar corporations. It is also important to
note that Sarbanes-Oxley includes new and more stringent criminal
penalties that directly address the need to deter future misconduct.
The Senate indicated that Sarbanes-Oxley includes three major
components that enhances accountability. First, it provides prosecu-
tors with new and better tools to effectively prosecute and punish
those who defraud investors, which means ensuring criminal laws are
flexible enough to keep pace with the most sophisticated and clever
con artists.49 It also means having criminal penalties tough enough to
make con artists think twice before defrauding the public.5 0 Specifi-
cally, the Act provides two new criminal statutes which would clarify
and plug holes in the current criminal laws relating to the destruction
or fabrication of evidence and the preservation of financial and audit
records.51 Further, Congress created three new obstruction-related of-
fenses,5 2 heightened penalties in the securities fraud context,53 and
49. S. REP. No. 107-146 at 8.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence As-
pects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 671 (2002) (indicating Section
1102 of Sarbanes-Oxley amends 18 U.S.C. § 1512 to create a maximum twenty-year sentence for
efforts or attempts to tamper with records or otherwise obstruct official proceedings, and Section
802 of Sarbanes-Oxley contains obstruction statutes aimed at heightened penalties related to
bankruptcy obstruction and destruction of auditing materials).
53. Id. at 681 (noting a new provision of the Securities Act of 1933 was intended to make it
easier to win a securities fraud prosecution and is modeled on the mail and wire fraud statues, as
well as more recent provisions aimed at bank and health care fraud).
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more stringent penalties for certain existing crimes. 54 Collectively,
these new criminal penalties and heightened maximum penalties act
as appropriate deterrence mechanisms in ways disgorgement penalties
were unable to achieve. Ultimately, Sarbanes-Oxley protects victims'
rights to recover from those who have cheated them. 55
Given that the deterrent effect of disgorgement funds in the corpo-
rate context is de minimus at best, such plans are more properly classi-
fied as compensatory in nature. A disgorgement fund functions as an
equitable remedy for restitution and the Fair Funds provision of
Sarbanes Oxley, which authorizes disgorgement funds to be disbursed
for the benefit of the victims of corporate misconduct, is an ideal
means to accomplish the goal of compensation. In response to the
contention that disgorgement penalties are primarily compensatory,
the Second Circuit indicated disgorgement funds may, at the discre-
tion of the SEC, be added to and become part of the disgorgement
fund for the benefit of the victims of the violation. 56 Discretion, the
court urged, was significant because potentially no funds at all need be
distributed to the victims of fraud, but instead may be paid to the
United States Treasury.57
However, the Act's legislative history indicates that Congress's in-
tention behind allowing the Commission discretion in obtaining dis-
gorgement from parties convicted or held liable for wrongdoing was
not to bolster the position that such penalties were deterrent in na-
ture; rather, the Commission's discretion was intended to allow room
to exempt such individuals from disgorgement penalties where such
liability would be inappropriate. 58 In fact, one House Report indicated
the Commission should conduct an analysis of whether, and under
what conditions, any officer or director should be required to disgorge
profits gained, or losses avoided, in the sale of the securities immedi-
ately preceding the filing of a restated financial statement on the
54. Id. at 684 (stating maximum penalties for mail and wire fraud were increased from five to
twenty years, maximum criminal penalties under the Exchange Act were increased for individu-
als from fines of one million dollars and imprisonment of ten years to fines of five million dollars
and imprisonment of twenty years, as well as various increases in criminal ERISA violations).
55. S. REP. No. 107-146 at 8 (2002). This section of the report indicated one of the three
purposes of the proposed legislation was not only to deter future misconduct, but also to focus
on providing means for victims of corporate fraud to recover the losses resulting from that cor-
ruption. Id.
56. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 82 (2d
Cir. 2006) (stating the SEC may now, if it chooses, use civil penalties that it sought for the
purposes of deterrence to compensate injured investors).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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party's behalf.5 9 Discretion, then, acts as a means to avoid an inequita-
ble result in the use of disgorgement plans, rather than as an attesta-
tion that such plans are instituted to deter misconduct.
The Committee on Financial Services further indicated that if the
Commission chose to issue a disgorgement of profits, it should have
done so only after providing safeguards and exemptions to ensure
such disgorgement is required, that is, only in cases where the Com-
mission can prove extreme misconduct on the part of that officer or
director. 60 The Committee noted safeguards must be in place to en-
sure no funds were disgorged from corporate actors when such a pen-
alty would be unwarranted or would not further the interest of public
policy.61 Given that the Commission is required to engage in such a
highly particularized investigation of the circumstances surrounding
any disgorgement order, it stands to reason the discretion provided in
the Fair Funds provision was Congress's solution to exempt corporate
officers from disgorgement penalties rather than an affirmation of the
position that such penalties remain deterrent in nature.
The Report authorizes the Commission to exempt any officer or
director from an order requiring disgorgement of profits when such an
order is inappropriate in the public interest, unnecessary for the pro-
tection of investors, unduly impairs the operations of issuers, or inhib-
its orderly operation of the securities markets.62 Here, intent is shown
to allow for an independent review of the particular circumstances of
any given case to determine whether invocation of the Fair Funds pro-
vision is appropriate. Such independent review is distinct and wholly
separate from any indication that disgorgement funds function prima-
rily as a deterrent of future misconduct.
Even more indicative of disgorgement plans' compensatory nature,
which the Second Circuit conveniently ignored in its opinion, is the
fact that the Commission was required to conduct a study to review
and analyze the effectiveness of the Fair Funds provision. 63 The study
required the Commission to review and analyze enforcement actions
59. H.R. REP. No. 107-414 (2002).
60. Id. at 21 (stating the Committee intends that the SEC would, in establishing any such
rules, ensure fair and impartial procedures, with a right to appeal, for the adjudication of any
action to require disgorgement).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(C)(1) (2006). The statute states the:
Commission shall review and analyze-(A) enforcement actions by the Commission
over the five years preceding July 30, 2002 that have included proceedings to obtain
civil penalties or disgorgements to identify areas where such proceedings may be uti-
lized to efficiently, effectively, and fairly provide restitution for injured investors; and
(B) other methods to more efficiently, effectively, and fairly provide restitution to in-
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by the Commission, obtain civil penalties or disgorgements, and iden-
tify areas where such proceedings may efficiently, effectively, and
fairly provide restitution for injured investors.64 Again, congressional
intent to provide compensation for victims of corporate misconduct
was revealed. The fact that Congress required the Commission to con-
duct an individualized review of disgorgement penalties for the pur-
pose of efficient restitution indicated the focus of the Fair Funds
provision was on compensating victims of corporate fraud.
III. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF DETERRENCE AND ITS ROLE
IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT
Central to this Comment's thesis is the proposition that disgorge-
ment penalties are incapable of adequately deterring corporate execu-
tives from engaging in fraudulent activity. As this Part will illustrate,
corporate actors face independent market forces, which neutralize any
deterrent effect compelled disgorgement of ill-gotten funds may have
on those actors. Initially, this Part introduces the economic theory of
deterrence and explores the "Rational Actor" concept. In discussing
the economic theory of deterrence, it is important to bear in mind
corporate executives' exposure to the criminal penalties found within
Sarbanes-Oxley are beyond the scope of this Comment. However, the
inclusion of distinct criminal penalties within Sarbanes-Oxley strongly
suggests the Act's deterrent goals are accomplished by means wholly
separate from compelled disgorgement penalties.
The economic theory of deterrence was pioneered by Gary Becker
in his 1968 article on crime and punishment, and has been expanded
upon in the corporate arena in numerous law review and journal arti-
cles.65 The fundamental premise behind the economic deterrent
model rests on the position that individuals are willing to commit
crimes if the expected benefits of the crime exceed the expected bene-
fits of engaging in lawful activity. 66 "Pain and pleasure are the great
jured investors, including methods to improve the collection rates for civil penalties and
disgorgements.
Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. (emphasis added). The study should also identify other methods to effectively, effi-
ciently, and fairly provide restitution to injured investors including methods to improve collec-
tion rates for civil penalties and disgorgements. Id.
65. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968), available at http://www.jstor.org/view/OO223808/di950919/95pO315/0; see also Perino,
supra note 52.
66. Perino, supra note 52, at 3; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw
242 (5th ed. 1998).
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springs of human action. '67 If "the apparent magnitude or value of the
pleasure or good he expects to be the consequence of the act, he will
be absolutely prevented from performing it."'68 Furthermore:
Economic analyses of deterrence are based on applying a price the-
ory to activities. From an economic perspective people therefore en-
gage in or refrain from injury causing behavior depending on how
much they gain or lose from doing so. If the sanctions or "prices"
are too high, rational people will refrain from the injury-causing or
prohibited conduct. 69
There are three main components to an individual's determination
of the economic utility of engaging in criminal behavior: (1) the sub-
jective probability of being caught and convicted; (2) the monetary
equivalent of the punishment if convicted; and (3) the gain from com-
mitting the crime. 70 Under the Rational Actor Model, "[e]ach individ-
ual calculates with more or less correctness, according to the degrees
of his information, and the power of the motives which actuate him."'71
A person commits a crime because the expected benefits of the crime
to him exceed the expected costs. 72 A key assumption, however, this
theory makes is rational actors are faced with only those "prices" im-
posed by the criminal or civil justice system. A disgorgement penalty
is a repayment of ill-gotten gains imposed on wrongdoers by the judi-
cial system. "Funds that were received through illegal or unethical
business transactions are disgorged, or paid back, with interest to
those affected by the action. Disgorgement is a remedial civil action,
rather than a punitive action. ' 73 The assumption that disgorgement
adequately deters corporate misconduct cannot be made in the con-
text of corporate executive activity where corporate actors are faced
with independent business and market pressures, subsuming any
threat the deprivation of ill-gotten gains may pose, as explained
below.
67. JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW 396, 402 (J. Bowring ed., 1843) ("[W]hen a
man perceives or supposes pain to be the consequence of an act, he is acted upon in such a
manner as tends, with a certain force, to withdraw him ... from the commission of that act.").
68. Id.
69. Yoram Keinan, Playing the Audit Lottery: The Role of Penalties in the U.S. Tax Law in the
Aftermath of Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 381, 391
(2006).
70. Perino, supra note 52, at 675.
71. BENTHAM, supra note 67, at 402.
72. POSNER, supra note 66, at 242 (noting studies have shown that criminals respond to
changes in opportunity costs, the probability of apprehension, the severity of punishment, and in
other relevant variables as if they were the rational calculators of the economic model).
73. Investopedia, Disgorgement, http://www.investopedia.comlterms/dldisgorgement.asp (last
visited Feb. 20, 2008).
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According to the Second Circuit, the Fair Funds for Investors provi-
sion of Sarbanes-Oxley, which authorizes the Commission to deposit
in a disgorgement fund any civil penalty obtained under the securities
laws in an action against an individual, primarily functions as a deter-
rent against future corporate malfeasance. 74 Theorists distinguish be-
tween the effect of punishment as a general deterrent and its effect as
a specific deterrent. 75 Punishment acts as a general deterrent insofar
as the threat of punishment deters potential offenders in the general
community; it may also act as a specific deterrent insofar as the inflic-
tion of punishment on convicted defendants makes them less likely to
engage in the crime again.76 While few will dispute a civil and criminal
penalty assessed and ordered to be contributed to a disgorgement
fund qualifies as a specific deterrent as against the individual, dis-
gorgement as an equitable remedy bears a more tenuous relationship
to the concept of general deterrence in the realm of multi-billion-dol-
lar corporate scandals. As the following studies of the Enron and
WorldCom scandals illustrate, the Rational Actor Model breaks down
as the economic pressure corporate executives face elevates to a level
beyond the contemplation of a reasonable person.
A. Disgorgement Funds and the Myth of General Deterrence in the
Corporate Context: Enron Study
The Enron controversy centered on a series of partnerships created
by Enron officials for the sole purpose of offsetting or concealing
losses incurred by independent merchant investments. 77 On October
16, 2001, Enron announced it was taking a five hundred and forty-four
million dollars after-tax charge against earnings and a reduction of
shareholders' equity by one billion, two hundred million dollars re-
lated to a transaction with one of its partnerships. 78 Less than one
month later, Enron announced it was restating its financial statements
74. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 81-82 (2d
Cir. 2006).
75. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 116 (7th ed. 2001).
76. Id.
77. WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET. AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGA-
TIVF COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 4 (2002), available at http://
fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf [hereinafter
ENRON INVESTIGATIVE REPORT] (noting the partnerships "allowed Enron to conceal from the
market very large losses resulting from Enron's merchant investments by creating the appear-
ance that those investments were hedged-that is, that a third party was obligated to pay Enron
the amount of those losses-when in fact that entity was simply an entity in which only Enron
had substantial economic stake").
78. Id. at 2.
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for the period from 1997 to 2001 because of accounting errors relating
to various other partnerships controlled by Enron. 79 Essentially, En-
ron "became a very large hedge fund, which just happened to own a
power company. While that in itself does not warrant criticism, it was
the extraordinary risk-taking by powerful executives which rarely ad-
ded value, but simply accelerated the cash burn-off rate," placing mil-
lions of dollars in employees' benefits at unnecessary risk.80 In
conjunction with the loss-concealing transactions involving its alleged
special purpose entities, Enron's key executives were being enriched
by tens of millions of dollars they should never have received. 81
The true victims of the Enron scandal were the employees who
were locked into the company's stocks in the form of 401K plans,
while the top executives were unloading their positions in the com-
pany. Enron stock, which at one point had sold in excess of eighty-two
dollars-per-share, plummeted to twenty-six cents-per-share. 82 "What
is clear is that people have been hurt by the collapse of Enron, from
the thousands of investors whose retirement and other investment
savings have been devastated to the thousands of employees who now
find themselves without a job."'83 Such was the belief of a multitude of
public officials throughout the many hearings on the Enron scandal.
Investors, workers, and creditors alike had been wrongfully de-
prived of their wealth and were left with lawsuits as their only assets.
Outside investors, free to sell their Enron stock at any time, advanced
the position that they were defrauded by executives and directors be-
cause senior management knew the company's stock was overvalued
and failed to share information with Enron investors; outside inves-
tors also presented evidence suggesting Enron executives bullied ana-
lysts who questioned the value of the company's stock.84 The roots of
Enron's corporate misconduct ran deep and affected a far-reaching
79. Id.
80. The Enron Collapse: Impact on Investors and Financial Markets: J. Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises and the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations, 107th Cong. 2 (2001) (statement of Rep. Richard H.
Baker) [hereinafter Hearing].
81. ENRON INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 81, at 3-4, 8-9 (indicating Andrew Fastow,
Enron's Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, received at least thirty million
dollars, Kopper received at least ten million dollars, and still two more amounts that the Investi-
gative Committee believed to be in the "hundreds of thousands of dollars").
82. Hearing, supra note 80, at 82 (statement of Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez).
83. Id. at 68 (statement of Rep. Sue Kelly).
84. Recine, supra note 30, at 1540 ("[A]gencies that provided credit ratings for Enron did not
downgrade the credit rating even as late as November 2001, when the company was teetering on
the edge of bankruptcy... [which] raised questions about the agencies' relationships with Enron
executives.").
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and diverse group of victims. Many credit the unveiled corruption
within Enron as the spark that ignited more stringent corporate gov-
ernance, which in turn led to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. Collec-
tively, the scandals of Enron, Global Crossing,85 Adelphia,86 and
WorldCom forced Congress to answer the public outcry for greater
corporate accountability by passing Sarbanes-Oxley.
B. Disgorgement Funds and the Myth of General Deterrence in the
Corporate Context: WorldCom Study
This Section centers on an in-depth study of WorldCom's Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer, Bernard J. Ebbers, and his role in the largest corpo-
rate scandal in recent history. First, a factual background of the
WorldCom scandal reveals the extreme financial pressure Ebbers
faced at the alleged height of his reign as a WorldCom executive of-
ficer. Next, this Section suggests the prospect of financial ruin Ebbers,
or any executive in a similar situation, so outweighed the possibility of
fine or conviction that any formulaic adherence to the Rational Actor
Model of economic deterrence would become skewed to the point of
complete speculation. Finally, this Section surmises any deterrent ef-
fect a conviction or order to disgorge all ill-received funds from corpo-
rate misconduct would be so de minimus as to be non-existent.
"On June 25, 2002, World[C]om announced its intention to restate
its financial results for all four quarters of 2001 and the first quarter of
2002 because of accounting irregularities. ' 87 These irregularities com-
prised of more than nine billion dollars in false or unsupported ac-
counting entries made in WorldCom's financial systems in order to
achieve desired reported financial results.88 The Special Investigative
Committee of the Board of Directors of WorldCom indicated the
fraud occurred as a result of knowing misconduct, which was directed
85. Id. at 1541. Recine notes:
Global Crossing executives profited from the inflated value of the company by selling
more than $1 billion in personal stock during the three-year period before the company
filed for Chapter 11.... Like Enron, the Global Crossing Board, which was responsible
for assuring the accuracy of the company's records, was replete with conflicts of inter-
est. Many of Global Crossing's audit committee members were personal friends of
[Global Crossing CEO Gary] Winnick.
Id.
86. Id. at 1542 ("In late March 2002, Adelphia, the nation's sixth-largest cable operator, dis-
closed that it had failed to report $2.3 billion in debt.").
87. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.
2006).
88. WORLDCOM INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9 ("In total, from the second quar-
ter of 1999 through the first quarter of 2002, WorldCom improperly reduced its reported line
costs (and increased pre-tax income) by over $7 billion.").
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by a few senior WorldCom executives and implemented by personnel
in its financial and accounting departments.89 The following factual
recitation centers on the role Bernard Ebbers, WorldCom's Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer, played in the WorldCom scandal as revealed by the
Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of
WorldCom, Inc.:
In the 1990s, the principal business strategy of WorldCom's Chief
Executive Officer, Bernard J. Ebbers, was growth through acquisi-
tions. The currency for much of that strategy was WorldCom stock,
and the success of the strategy depended on a consistently increas-
ing stock price. WorldCom pursued scores of increasingly large ac-
quisitions. The strategy reached its apex with WorldCom's
acquisition in 1998 of MCI Communications Corporation ("MCI"),
a company more than two-and-a-half times WorldCom's size (by
revenues). Ebbers [sic] acquisition strategy largely came to an end
by early 2000 when WorldCom was forced to abandon a proposed
merger with Sprint Corporation because of antitrust objections.
Ebbers presented a substantially false picture to the market, to
the Board of Directors, and to most of the Company's own employ-
ees. At the same time he was projecting, and then reporting, contin-
ued vigorous growth, he was receiving internal information that was
increasingly inconsistent with those projections and reports. Moreo-
ver, he did not disclose the persistent use of non-recurring items to
boost reported revenues ....
[At the same time,] Ebbers directed significant energy to building
and protecting his own personal financial empire, with little atten-
tion to the risks these distractions and financial obligations placed
on the Company that was making him one of the highest paid exec-
utives in the country. It was when his personal financial empire was
under the greatest pressure-when he had the greatest need to keep
WorldCom's stock price up in order to avoid margin calls he could
not meet-that the largest part of the fraud occurred. 90
A basic margin transaction involves borrowing a portion of the funds
used to purchase stocks or options and is generally utilized to take
advantage of opportunities in the market.91 The borrowing party pays
interest on the funds borrowed until the loan is repaid in full. 92 If and
when the account equity falls below a specified point, typically the
Federal Reserve Board's fifty percent margin requirement, the ac-
count enters into a "call" situation, whereupon the lending party may
liquidate the account's stocks or options without notice to meet the
89. Id. at 6-7.
90. WORLDCOM INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-6.
91. E*Trade Financial, Help Center: Trade on Margin, https://us.etrade.com/e/t/estation/help?
id=1302000000#Meet (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
92. Id.
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balance owed.93 According to one report, Mr. Ebbers chose to finance
his acquisition-based business plan by taking out loans from commer-
cial banks, many of which were margin loans secured by Ebbers's
WorldCom stock.94 In fact, the Wall Street Journal reported that over
a period of seven years, Ebbers took out such loans totaling about
$929 million from non-WorldCom lenders. 95 Further, the general
terms of these margin loans, although varying in their precise wording,
required that the value of Ebbers's stock to remain greater than or
equal to some multiple of the amount of the loan.96
The massive amount and terms of the above margin loans are signif-
icant because they create an independent market pressure on an exec-
utive's, in this case Mr. Ebbers's, personal financial welfare,
essentially negating any deterrent effect disgorgement of ill-received
gains might create. If we abandon the vision of the corporation as a
rational actor and replace it with a vision of the corporation as a con-
glomeration of individual actors, then the mathematical calculations
of corporate deterrence begin to lose their appeal. 97 Regardless of
how well the deterrent sanction is tailored to internalize the total so-
cial costs, the decisions that lead to violations still reside in managers
and other agents who might bring their own external costs and bene-
fits to the decision-making process.98 Executives do not always con-
fine their decisions to the costs and benefits that will accrue to the
corporation's shareholders or other stakeholders.99 Turning to the
three factors of the economic deterrence theory, the subjective
probability of being caught and convicted, the monetary equivalent of
the punishment of convicted, and the gain from committing the crime,
we now may substitute the actual figures of Ebbers's situation to re-
veal the tenuous effect the threat of disgorgement penalties had in his
case.
For the sake of ease and clarity, this Comment will substitute round
numbers for the precise figures relevant to Mr. Ebbers's financial situ-
ation. As stated above, Mr. Ebbers took out roughly nine hundred
and thirty million dollars in commercial margin loans from indepen-
dent banks. As WorldCom's stock price fell from a high of sixty-two
dollars-a-share on June 21, 1999 to $36.52 on April 14, 2000, Bank of
93. Id.
94. WORLDCOM INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 1.
95. Id. at 195 n.106.
96. Id.
97. Matthew G. Morris, The Executive Role in Culturing Export Control Compliance, 104
Mici. L. REV. 1785, 1793 (2006).
98. Id.
99. Id.
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America, one of Ebbers's principal lenders, made a margin call on its
outstanding loans.100 Unable to satisfy the balance of the margin call,
Ebbers began to borrow funds from WorldCom under the authoriza-
tion of his Board of Directors, an amount that was eventually consoli-
dated into a single promissory note of approximately four hundred
and eight million dollars. 10 1 All of these transactions were made, at
least in part, by Ebbers to secure his personal fortune of nearly forty
million dollars. 10 2 It is important to note the monetary value assigned
to incarceration associated with corporate misconduct is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
C. Independent Market Forces Subsume Any Deterrent Effect
Disgorgement Penalties Have on Corporate Executives
Given the above facts, the next step in the economic theory requires
that a monetary value be given to each of the above three factors in
Jeremy Bentham's model. First, in order to identify the value of the
"gain" from committing the crime, in this case the fraudulent report-
ing of earnings to artificially inflate WorldCom's stock price, the
amount Ebbers stood to lose must be determined. The very purpose
of Ebbers's fraudulent activity was motivated primarily to secure his
personal financial wealth by avoiding the various margin calls that
were secured by his stock in WorldCom. 10 3 Therefore, the amount he
stood to gain from engaging in the fraudulent conduct was the amount
equal to retention of the personal wealth he had accumulated at the
time the misconduct took place. This value was calculated to nearly
forty million dollars;1 04 this Comment will use this amount for the pur-
poses of engaging in the risk calculus of the economic theory.
Second, a value must be given to the monetary equivalent of the
punishment if convicted. Again, this Comment's focus is solely on the
alleged deterrent effect disgorgement penalties have on an executive's
conduct. Disgorgement, by definition, is "[t]he act of giving up some-
thing (such as profits illegally obtained) on demand or by legal com-
pulsion."' -0 5 Here, a distinction must be made between the misconduct
of the principal agents of WorldCom collectively and the misconduct
of Bernard Ebbers individually. While WorldCom as a corporation
100. WORLDCOM INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 303.
101. Id. at 304.
102. See Gretchen Morgenson, Ebbers to Shed Assets, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2005, at C1.
103. WORLDCOM INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6 ("Ebbers directed significant
energy to building and protecting his own personal financial empire, with little or no attention to
the risks these distractions and financial obligations placed on [WorldCom].").
104. Morgenson, supra note 106, at C1.
105. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 501 (8th ed. 2004).
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was held liable in a Commission enforcement action for two and one
quarter billion dollars in civil penalties, as well as a disgorgement pen-
alty of one dollar through the payment of (a) five hundred million
dollars cash, and (b) common stock of reorganized WorldCom valued
at two hundred fifty million dollars, Ebbers was held accountable only
for a fraction of that amount.10 6 Ebbers was ordered to disgorge forty
million dollars of his personal assets.10 7 Therefore, the forty million
dollar figure serves as the monetary equivalent of Ebbers's
punishment.
Finally, the third component of the deterrence theory requires that
a value be given to the subjective probability of being caught and con-
victed. Violators have strong incentives to conceal their illegal conduct
and, thereby, avoid the imposition of a fine.'08 "Hence, many violators
will not be fined, and the harms resulting from their violations will go
uncompensated.' ' 0 9 Given the speculative nature of this figure, it is
sufficient for the purposes of this Comment to note it weighs against
the possibility that the penalty for engaging in illegal conduct will ac-
tually be realized. Thus, under the Rational Actor Model of deter-
rence, the risk-calculus weighs in favor of engaging the illegal activity
for the situation Mr. Ebbers was in. This calculus can be demonstrated
as follows:
List of Variables
" Gain from engaging in fraudulent reporting of earnings: forty
million dollars, that is retention of forty million dollars (Eb-
bers's personal fortune) from liquidation sales of margin calls on
his commercial loans.
* Monetary equivalent of punishment if convicted: forty million
dollars, that is amount of actual disgorgement order.
* Subjective probability of being caught and convicted: (acts of
concealment + costs of detection) - (X); this figure must be sub-
tracted from the probability that the forty million dollar convic-
tion amount will actually be realized.
106. Brief of SEC at 2, Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC,
No. 04-4710 (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 2005).
107. Morgenson, supra note 106, at C1.
108. Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behav-
ior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395, 397 (1991) (stating "there are also costs involved in detecting violations
and in imposing fines," which must also factor in to the value given to the probability that a
violation will be detected).
109. Id.
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Risk Calculus
* Forty million dollars (that is, retention of personal fortune) is
greater than forty million dollars (that is, disgorgement of ill-gotten
funds) minus X (that is, acts of concealment and costs of
detection).
As the above calculus demonstrates, disgorgement of ill-gotten
funds from fraudulent corporate conduct does not carry with it a
strong enough penalty or disincentive to persuade a rational actor to
avoid misconduct when the "cost" of doing so equals the threatened
punishment. In the context of WorldCom, Mr. Ebbers exposed his
personal fortune to the threat of liquidation by the means of past due
margin calls. Here, the margin calls acted as an independent threat to
his fortune, having the same force and effect that the prospect of dis-
gorgement of his wealth posed. The potential realization of the margin
call skews the extra-rational calculus of an actor in a similar situation
to Mr. Ebbers by exacerbating his behavioral bias toward conceal-
ment of fraudulent activity, which further undermines deterrence of
malfeasance and warps perceptions of materiality.110
The optimal penalty theory of economic deterrence:
Requires that fines be set at a level which fully reflects the costs to
society of a prohibited activity engaged in by an economic agent.
Society must impose penalties on these agents because, otherwise,
these agents would force society to bear the cost of the harms which
result from their engaging in a prohibited activity."1
Optimal fines force economic agents to internalize the total cost of
their activities.'1 2 Here, the threat of margin calls, which would liqui-
date all of Mr. Ebbers's personal holdings, acted as the "optimal pen-
alty" in this instance. Significantly, these margin calls would have
reached even those personal assets that were completely personal to
Ebbers and unrelated to the corporate misconduct. It stands to reason
then, that any deterrent effect potential disgorgement of the profits
Mr. Ebbers illegally gained became secondary and insignificant.
A disgorgement penalty functions primarily as a vehicle to redistrib-
ute funds wrongfully taken from victims of corporate misconduct
rather than as a deterrent to such misconduct. As the above section
illustrated, independent market forces pose a more extreme threat to
a corporate executive's personal wealth than does the prospect of be-
ing deprived of gains associated with misconduct. The reach of margin
110. Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities
Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 397 (2006).
111. Block, supra note 108, at 397.
112. Id.
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calls extend to the entirety of an executive's fortune, whereas a dis-
gorgement penalty is limited to those funds an executive realized as a
result of his involvement in fraudulent activity. Given the very nature
of a disgorgement penalty is to force a wrongdoer to part from the
fruits of his or her misconduct, it follows that the funds should be
returned to their rightful owners as compensation for the victims of a
violation. Further, the United States Supreme Court has expressly
stated disgorgement of profits "is a remedy only for restitution. '113 In
that case, the Supreme Court distinguished disgorgement penalties
from traditional civil penalties or fines by indicating disgorgement of
funds served an additional purpose of providing restitution by re-
turning to the proper owner property or the monetary value of a loss
sustained.
Traditionally, restitution is defined as a deprivation of profit or
wrongfully received money or property in favor of the aggrieved par-
ties for actual damages or loss caused by an offense. 114 As the follow-
ing section will demonstrate, Congress undoubtedly recognized the
shortcomings of disgorgement penalties as a deterrent. Although it
would be presumptuous to identify a single purpose behind any partic-
ular piece of legislation, this Comment suggests that the tenuous rela-
tionship between disgorgement penalties and a deterrent effect of
corporate misconduct provided Congress with an opportunity to shift
the policy objective of disgorgement plans to that of compensation of
the victims of fraudulent activity.
IV. INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DISGORGEMENT PLANS
ARE REQUIRED TO ENSURE THAT DISGORGEMENT PLANS
REALIZE THEIR INTENDED GOAL OF COMPENSATING
VICTIMS OF CORPORATE FRAUD
Having disposed of the contention that disgorgement plans are pri-
marily deterrent in nature, this Part proposes that an independent
standard of review must be given to potential disgorgement plans to
ensure that identified parties are placed in their rightful position. As
the scandals of WorldCom, Enron, and other corporations have
demonstrated, large groups of investors and creditors were devastated
by the loss of their investments or business transactions with those
corporations. Once the fraud was exposed, these parties not only lost
the entirety of their investments, but would also have been left with-
113. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987) (indicating an action for disgorgement of
profits is a remedy only for restitution, a more limited form of relief than a civil penalty).
114. See generally 3 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 528.2 (2007).
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out remedy if the Commission decided not to establish disgorgement
funds after obtaining civil judgments against these corporations.
In electing to create a disgorgement fund "for the benefit of the
victims" of corporate fraud pursuant to its authority under the Fair
Funds for Investors provision of Sarbanes-Oxley, the Commission im-
plicitly acknowledges the victims' reliance interest in transacting with
the violating entities and undertakes an obligation to satisfy that inter-
est. This Comment demonstrates the Second Circuit was misguided in
embracing a "fair and reasonable" standard of review for proposed
disgorgement plans and suggests that heightened independent reviews
of such plans are required to restore victims to their rightful positions.
The Second Circuit expressed in its opinion that once a district
court determines the distribution of disgorgement fund proceeds are
"fair and reasonable," its review is at an end. The court, however, de-
viated from that standard by acknowledging a district court need not
make an inquiry into the effect that a disgorgement plan has on indi-
vidual investors. 115 This position disregards the fact that investors and
creditors have, at times, very significant reliance interests in con-
ducting business and maintaining financial relationships with various
corporate entities. Creditors and investors alike conduct extensive
value analyses prior to transacting with corporations in an effort to
safeguard their investments.
One principle method by which investors and creditors make such
valuation analyses is the asset-based method. Asset based methods
start with the book value of a company's equity, which is simply the
value of all the company's assets, less its debt.11 6 As will be presently
demonstrated, a corporation that publishes balance sheets or other fi-
nancial reports indicating its asset holdings invites outside creditors
and investors to rely on the figures contained in those reports as a
basis for their investment or other business decisions. Parties relying
on these figures generate a reliance interest in their authenticity, an
interest that must be protected should the Commission decide to exer-
cise its disgorgement authority under the Fair Funds Provision of
Sarbanes-Oxley.
115. SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 713 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he district court possesses the equi-
table power to grant disgorgement without inquiring whether, or to what extent, identifiable
parties have been damaged by the [defendant's] fraud.").
116. Ian H. Giddy, Methods of Corporate Valuation, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY (2006), http://
pages.stern.nyu.edu/-igiddy/valuationmethods.htm (stating equity includes tangible things like
cash, current assets, working capital and shareholder's equity, or intangible qualities like man-
agement or brand name, or essentially everything that a company would have if it were to sud-
denly stop selling products and stop making money tomorrow, and pay off all its creditors).
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The Second Restatement of Contracts ("Restatement") provides a
judicial remedy for the reliance interest of a promise, which is defined
as "an interest in being reimbursed for loss caused in reliance on a
contract by being put in as good a position as he or she would have
been in if the contract would not have been made. '117 Further, be-
cause, in the case of creditors and investors, value is conferred to the
corporation, whether in the form of a monetary loan or funds given
for a percentage of control in the company, a restitution interest is
created if the value is given as a result of fraudulent conduct. Again,
the Restatement provides for restitution interest, which is defined as
an "interest in having restored to him any benefit that he or she has
conferred on the other party. ' 118 Interestingly enough, no mention is
made of a "disgorgement interest" in either the Restatement or case
law.
Perhaps the most comprehensive definition of a disgorgement inter-
est was explained by Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen in their collec-
tive article on law and economics. 11 9 "'Perfect disgorgement' [is] a
sanction that restores the wrongdoer to the same position that she
would have been in but for the wrong [and thus] strips the agent of
her gain from misappropriation and leaves her no better or worse off
than if she had done no wrong." 120 Thus, in the context of corporate
fraud or other misconduct, an individual's disgorgement interest is the
sum of her reliance interest, which created the injury, and her restitu-
tion interest, which requires compensation for injury based on reli-
ance upon the misconduct. Significant here is the fact that the United
States Supreme Court expressly adopted this position when it stated
that an equitable action for disgorgement of profits "[wa]s a remedy
only for restitution, a more limited form of relief than a civil pen-
alty."'1 21 It stands to reason then, that when the Commission invokes
the Fair Funds provision to order disgorgement of profits ill-received
from corporate misconduct, it assumes the responsibility to protect
both the reliance and restitution interests, together constituting the
disgorgement interest, of all identifiable victims of the misconduct.
While the Second Circuit placed great emphasis on the fact that the
Commission has the discretion to authorize such disgorgement plans
in its holding that disgorgement penalties were primarily deterrent in
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981).
118. Id.
119. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Char-
acter and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045 (1991).
120. Id. at 1051.
121. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987).
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nature, it failed to properly dissect the ability to order disgorgement
of profits from the disgorgement interest protected once such a plan is
ordered. Although the Fair Funds Provision certainly does provide the
Commission with discretion to invoke disgorgement of profits, the
provision more probably intended to allow for exemptions from liabil-
ity when necessary; once disgorgement is ordered, both the victims'
reliance and restitution interests are invoked as a matter of course.
Thus, it is incomprehensible to hold to the belief that merely a "fair
and reasonable" cursory review of a proposed disgorgement plan is
sufficient to protect these interests.
For victims of corporate fraud to fully realize the protection of their
reliance and compensatory interests, an independent review of the
particular circumstances surrounding both the nature of the fraud and
the provisions of the disgorgement plan is necessary. While few will
dispute that multi-billion dollar corporate scandals create situations
making it difficult to identify all victims of the fraud, this is hardly
justification for the Commission to deny remedy to parties that bring
suit in the form of excluding them from proposed disgorgement plans
or denying them opportunities to introduce modifications that would
protect their reliance and restitution interests.
For example, the WorldCom bankruptcy left identifiable unsecured
creditors without recourse after the Second Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court decision to approve a disgorgement plan that excluded
large groups of creditors from the receipt of proceeds. 122 Because the
Second Circuit adopted a standard of review that gave no considera-
tion as to whether, or to what extent, individual parties were harmed
by WorldCom's fraud, these unsecured parties were left out of the
ultimate disgorgement plan.123 Unless an independent review of pro-
posed disgorgement plans is given in each instance of corporate mis-
conduct, the decision to approve of such distribution under a "fair and
reasonable" standard will, in many instances, lead to inequitable and
122. The proposed distribution plan excluded from participation in the fund:
(a) [A]ny person who made a net profit on that person's combined purchases and sales
of all eligible securities; (b) with respect to any particular eligible security, any securi-
tyholder (i) who received a higher payout under the plan with respect to such security
than that received by World[C]om's general unsecured creditors under the plan, or (ii)
who sold an eligible security after the conclusion of the fraud period at a price which
allowed the seller to recoup a percentage of the seller's purchase price that is higher
than the percentage recovery general unsecured creditors will receive under the plan;
and (c) any securityholder that purchased an eligible security prior to the commence-
ment of the fraud period and held such eligible security throughout such period in
reliance of World[C]om's fraud.
SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-CV-4963, 2004 WL 1621185 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004).
123. See id.
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potentially arbitrary exclusions of victims. As an example, the Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors generated the following
hypothetical:
Investor A bought WorldCom stock during the Fraud Period and
suffered a loss of $10,000 by selling on June 26, 2002, then rein-
vested the proceeds in MCI bonds and made a $15,000 profit for a
net gain of $5,000. Investor B also bought WorldCom stock during
the fraud period and also sold for a $10,000 loss, but reinvested the
proceeds of the sale in IBM stock, and made a $15,000 profit for a
net gain of $5,000. Each of these parties suffered a loss, followed by
a net gain in investment capital, yet investor B can still participate
[in the disgorgement plan while investor A is excluded]. This regime
is inherently unfair .... 124
As is apparent from the above hypothetical, inclusion in the pro-
posed disgorgement fund turned on the particular security an investor
subsequently added to his portfolio. Under the "fair and reasonable"
standard of review, such arbitrary exclusion was approved not only in
the initial reviewing court, but also on review when that standard of
review was challenged. No inquiry was made as to the extent of the
victims' reliance upon WorldCom's fraud, nor were the amounts of
the individual losses examined when this plan was approved. While all
parties potentially could have placed equal reliance upon the fraudu-
lent figures WorldCom released and would have equally viable claim
to disgorgement funds, the Second Circuit's refusal to authorize inde-
pendent review of the plan facilitated inequity in WorldCom's bank-
ruptcy distribution.
V. CONCLUSION
Corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom highlighted the
various inadequacies of corporate governance legislation in place
prior to passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. In response to these tragedies,
Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley to answer the public outcry in favor
of more stringent executive accountability and protection of investor
and creditor relationships with these corporations. Accompanying
passage of this legislation were the policy objectives of restoring inves-
tor confidence, protecting investments, and deterring future corporate
misconduct. Sarbanes-Oxley addressed these policy objectives by not
only creating and strengthening criminal penalties for corporate mis-
conduct, but also by providing means for reimbursing creditors and
124. Written Submission of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom,
Inc. et al. Regarding the Proposed Distribution Plan in Respect of July 7, 2003 Final Judgment as
to Monetary Relief, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., Civ. No. 02-CV-4963, 2004 WL 1932738 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 28, 2004).
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investors for the wrongful deprivation of their assets by corporate
corruption.
One such vehicle for providing victims of corporate scandals a
means of realizing their losses associated with the wrongdoing were
disgorgement penalties; which are authorized under the Fair Funds for
Investors provision of Sarbanes-Oxley. 125 In a case of first impression,
the Second Circuit held that disgorgement penalties were primarily
deterrent in nature and any compensatory affect that was to be attrib-
uted to such funds was secondary. 126 As a result, the panel approved
of the "fair and reasonable" standard of review a review, but in reality
adopted a standard that gave no consideration as to whether, or what
extent, any identifiable victims were harmed by the misconduct. This
position directly contradicts the fact that Sarbanes-Oxley's legislative
history indicates the a primary focus of the Act to be providing for
compensation of the victims of corporate misconduct. Disgorgement
funds are equitable remedies for restitution and have little deterrent
effect in the corporate arena, because corporate executives face inde-
pendent market forces and bring their own biases into a rational actor
analysis, subsuming the deterrent effect disgorgement penalties would
otherwise entail.
Because the primary objective of disgorgement penalties is properly
classified as compensatory in nature, if such a penalty is assessed, the
reliance and restitution interests of identifiable victims must be pro-
tected. To ensure that victims' reliance and restitution interests are
properly protected, as mandated by the Fair Funds provision, a re-
viewing court must conduct an independent review of the proposed
disgorgement plan obtained by the Commission to satisfy itself that
identifiable parties are properly reimbursed for the inequities brought
to them. A standard of review that merely ensures that the disgorge-
ment plan, as a whole, is "fair and reasonable" facilitates inequity by
allowing a reviewing court discretion to approve a plan that may arbi-
trarily exclude large groups of creditors or investors from the plan.
This injustice became reality when the Second Circuit affirmed a
New York district court decision to authorize a disgorgement plan that
excluded investors on the basis of whether they sold their positions in
WorldCom either the day of its announcement to restate its earnings,
or the next day thereafter. 127 Such a fortuitous event must not serve as
the basis for excluding a significant group of creditors and investors
125. 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2006).
126. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 81 (2d
Cir. 2006).
127. Id. at 84.
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from participation in an effort to provide compensation for funds
wrongfully taken from those parties. Should a reviewing court conduct
an independent review of the identifiable parties victimized by corpo-
rate fraud and their inclusion or exclusion from proposed disgorge-
ment funds, such injustice could be avoided.

